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Abstract 
Deep packet inspection (DPI) is becoming increasingly important as a means to classify and 
control Internet traffic based on the content, applications, and users.   Rather than just using 
packet header information, Internet Service Providers are using DPI for traffic management, 
routing and security.   But by being able to control traffic by content, a growing number of public 
policy makers and users fear ISPs may discriminately charge more for faster delivery of their 
data, slow down applications or even deny access.  They cite such practices as endangering the 
principle of net neutrality; the premise that all data on the Internet should be treated equally.   
The existing literature on DPI and net neutrality is sizeable, but little exists on the relationship 
between DPI and net neutrality.   This study examines the literature, develops a research 
methodology and presents results from a study on the challenges of DPI in regards to privacy and 
net neutrality. The findings show that although most users are unaware of DPI technology, they 
feel strongly that it places their privacy at risk. 
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Chapter 1 – Introduction 
 For decades, ISPs have been managing and routing traffic based on packet header 
information.  DPI, however, has emerged as a critical traffic management tool and is the subject 
of this research.  By being able to control traffic based on content, in addition to header 
information, DPI offers ISPs improved traffic management and routing as well as security.   But 
having ISPs controlling traffic content has lead to increasing public debate.  The opposing sides 
of the net neutrality debate argue that without safeguards in place, ISPs would cut lucrative deals 
to prioritize some kinds of content and throttle others, turning themselves into the unofficial 
gatekeepers of the world's best leveling force.   ISPs argue that practices such as tiered-pricing 
are needed to ensure continued investments in Internet infrastructure. 
This chapter introduces DPI and the concept of net neutrality.  It identifies how the 
technology works and the challenges it can present to net neutrality.  The chapter also describes 
the goals of the research and the research methodology used.  
1.1 Deep Packet Inspection Technology and Net Neutrality 
 Deep packet inspection takes the process of inspecting the origin and destination of 
packets and expands it to examine the actual data being sent.  This technology allows Internet 
Service Providers (ISPs) and network administrators the ability to filter data transmissions by 
denying, delaying or giving precedence to certain types of data.  
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 Historically, packet inspection occurred at the network layer which was dependant upon 
the header and footer information contained in packets to determine routing and filtering options.  
Deep packet inspection came about as a means to enhance the process to include the data that 
was once only accessible in the application and presentation layers of the OSI model.  Access to 
the presentation and application layer information at the network layer, allows for packet 
filtering to be implemented based on the actual data, not header information.  The ability to filter 
data at the lower layers allows ISPs to circumvent any header information and route packets 
based on what the payload contains.   
 As the type, contents, the destination and any digital signatures of the data can be 
identified, deep packet inspection can provide many benefits for ISP environments.    Kumar 
(2006) identified three popular applications of DPI: 
• Content-based traffic management and routing, where packets are classified and 
processed based upon content.  
• Network intrusion detection systems (NIDS) generally scan the packet header and 
payload to identify a given set of signatures of well known security threats. 
• Layer 7 switches and firewalls provide content-based filtering, load-balancing, 
authentication and monitoring.  
By applying content-based traffic management, ISPs can give priority to traffic based on the 
type of content being sent, guaranteeing enhanced delivery for premium content providers.  
Network intrusion detection systems (NIDS) utilize DPI to examine the content of packets and 
compare the digital signatures to a database of known threats, discarding transmissions that pose 
security risks.  DPI also enables layer 7 switches to become application aware.  This awareness 
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gives application layer switches the ability to filter traffic based on the type of application.  This 
provides ISPs with a scalable and efficient traffic management option. 
Such applications and benefits can provide ISPs an important competitive advantage.  
Stallings (2007) observed that many opportunities exist for companies to use differentiation as a 
strategy to create competitive advantages.  Today’s networks can offer differing levels of quality 
of service (QoS), which include specifications for maximum delay and minimum throughput.  
They also provide a variety of customizable services in the network management and security 
arenas.  Deep packet inspection can provide the differentiation that will help ISPs offer a wide 
array of services with guaranteed QoS levels.  These services and guarantees are possible 
because DPI allows network traffic to be manipulated with intimate knowledge of the data being 
sent. 
 Net neutrality enters the picture as the movement to keep the flow of information free.  
Free access to content, the ability to connect with any device or run any application is what has 
made the Internet so popular and useful.  This openness is the heart of innovation that has driven 
the rapid growth of the Internet and to deny any content, applications or devices would be 
stifling.  Net neutrality is the process of keeping the Internet open and freely available to all 
users, devices and content. 
Net neutrality began as an information revolution to help guide Internet policies as they 
were being formed.  Since 1930, the United States communication networks have been governed 
by non-discrimination policies like net neutrality.  Older regulations focusing on telephone 
communications still have their place, but updated regulation aimed at Internet communications 
should be addressed (Schahczenski, 2008).  
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 Congressional debate on net neutrality heated up in 2005 and the debate still continues.  
Initially, Congress had focused on video franchising, attempting to revamp the laws to allow 
phone companies to compete in the video space.  Once the legislation progressed, net neutrality 
as a whole was addressed and some minimal progress was achieved.  Although a recent bill was 
withdrawn, Congress continues the debate. 
By giving ISPs the ability to discriminate packets based on content or premium access, 
only ideas or services backed by a significant funding or offered by ISPs would flourish.  
Although the technology allows for safer, more scalable and more controllable networks, DPI 
raises serious concerns about privacy and net neutrality.   
1.2 Statement of Problem 
The problem under investigation in this study focuses on the threats that deep packet 
inspection can pose to net neutrality. 
DPI gives ISPs the ability to manipulate and inspect every bit of data sent over their 
networks and this does not sit well with pundits for net neutrality.  The ability to throttle 
services, divvy out bandwidth and even reject contents of information traversing the network 
goes against the philosophy of a Free Internet. 
1.3 Statement of Goals and Objectives 
Using data from a survey of Internet users, this study has three goals.  The first objective 
of the study is to determine the risks that DPI poses to net neutrality.  To reach this objective, a 
survey was conducted of Internet users.  The results of the study revealed that most users are not 
aware their privacy may even be compromised and that IT industry insiders appear largely in the 
dark with regards to network monitoring capabilities.  ISPs have always been able to challenge 
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the free flow of information, but deep packet inspection allows them to do so with frighteningly 
intrusive means.    
A second and more general objective is to add to the body of knowledge.    Considerable 
literature on DPI exists, but it is largely focused on technical issues and case studies.  The 
existing literature on net neutrality is also sizable.  But there exists little technical description on 
how ISPs use DPI for monitoring and control.  The study has emerged from this researcher’s 
belief that the coupling of DPI technology and its net neutrality context has not been well 
explored. 
Third, this researcher hopes that this study will result in informed public debate.  By 
discussing the technology behind deep packet inspection and mapping that to the affects it can 
have on privacy and a free Internet, this study attempts to educate the general user on challenges 
of DPI to network neutrality. 
1.4 Project Description 
To reach these goals, the research proceeded in three phases.  In the first phase, this 
researcher reviewed the existing literature, both in DPI and in net neutrality.   The literature is 
vast, yet weighs heavily to technical descriptions and public policy debate.  This paper attempts 
to redress this imbalance by examining and integrating DPI’s role in endangering net neutrality.   
The literature review also provided a better definition of guidelines for exploration, especially in 
phases of question generation and survey phases.     
In the second phase, specific questions were generated.    Should ISPs be allowed to 
examine the content of network communications?  Should they be allowed to deny or delay 
communications based on the type of content being sent (e.g., music, text, video)?  Should they 
be allowed to deny or delay communications if the content is business versus personal?  To 
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answer these questions, a survey represented the most appropriate research method to verify the 
knowledge and attitudes of the general Internet population.  These questions were grouped to 
determine specific types of information.  The first group was participant background 
information, followed by Internet communication questions, phone communication questions 
and finally privacy questions. 
In the third phase, the survey targeted general Internet users.  The sole criterion was that 
the participant had to have a working Facebook profile.  This tactic was selected for a few 
reasons.  First, through the popularity of Facebook, the rate of response was hoped to be 
adequate for the study (67, or 33% out of 200 responded to the invitation posted to Facebook).  
Second, by only querying active Facebook users, the respondents were guaranteed to be Internet 
users.  Lastly, Facebook provided a medium other than email to communicate the invitations to 
participate in the study.  It is this researcher’s belief that had email been employed, the rate of 
response would have been drastically reduced. 
The researcher felt this approach would be more rewarding than interviewing ISPs.   One 
of the fundamental questions in the net neutrality debate is how much ISPs should be allowed to 
discriminate packets traversing their networks.  As the debate rages on, the argument gets 
sidetracked with semantics.  ISPs argue that they have the right to manage traffic on their 
networks, users and content providers argue that while it is acceptable for ISPs to manage traffic, 
it is not within their rights to block or delay any traffic.  By focusing the study on users, the 
researcher hoped to avoid the black hole of the semantic argument.  
1.5 Summary 
Deep packet inspection provides many benefits to ISPs.  But it can also adversely affect 
privacy.  After laying the foundation for the technology and its benefits, the problem of net 
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neutrality and a free Internet were discussed.  Also, due to the lack of substantial literature on the 
specific impacts of DPI on privacy and net neutrality, it was necessary to generate a study 
surrounding the issue from the end user’s point of view.   It is these competing factors that 
combine to formulate the need for further research and education on the topic.  Finally, the 
chapter concluded by showing research method used. 
The next chapter presents a review of the literature on DPI and net neutrality. 
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Chapter 2 –Literature Review 
This chapter delves deeper into literature on deep packet inspection and net neutrality.  
There is considerable literature on DPI, but it is limited to engineering issues and case studies.   
The literature on net neutrality is also vast, but little exists on how DPI poses a threat to privacy.   
This research attempts to fill this gap.   
2.1 Deep Packet Inspection 
 A number of researchers have examined DPI technology.  Hills (2006), for example, 
stated that   DPI devices can operate on layers two through seven of the Open Systems 
Interconnect (OSI) model. 
 Deep packet inspection is packet filtering that inspects the data payload of an IP packet.  
DPI devices take deep looks into the data of each packet and either allows or denies passage 
according to some set of predetermined rules.  Smith (2008) noted that as networks incorporate 
increasingly sophisticated services into their infrastructure, DPI uses application-specific data 
found in packet payloads to make routing decisions, to block or rate-limit unwanted traffic, to 
perform intrusion detection, and to provide quality of service. 
The DPI inspection engine parses each packet and compares the contents against its rule 
set.  This rule set is comprised of known electronic signatures of content which allow 
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identification of the packet’s data.  In the past, network packets were classified by their headers, 
but DPI now allows them to be classified by the actual content of their payloads. 
To perform this functionality, DPI devices rely on a database of application signatures 
that are crosschecked against to determine the nature of the packet traversing the network.  The 
DPI device groups the packets by protocol and security levels then processes the packets by 
“performing application level checks as well as stateful inspection” (Ranum, 2005).  DPI devices 
look for any anomalies in the packets based on their know application signatures.  If any packet 
is deemed out of the ordinary, it is not allowed to pass.  An example would be the order in which 
commands are given for a certain protocol.  An application will always order commands in the 
same sequence, where as a human attempting to hack into a system might issue the commands in 
some random order.  By inspecting the packet for its application signature, then comparing that 
signature against known parameters, DPI devices can thwart attacks that would have gotten past 
traditional packet inspection principles. 
  Normally, DPI is used to monitor and shape IP traffic.  ISPs can use DPI to monitor the 
type of traffic on their networks and give priority to the protocols they deem more important.  
This type of traffic shaping can slow down less important protocols, while not entirely cutting of 
access to the particular service. 
Deep packet inspection does come with a heavy cost on the processing and bandwidth 
sides of the equation.  To perform such a thorough look at each individual packet traversing a 
network, while keeping the throughput speed at normal levels, is quite a challenge.  Becchi 
(2007) and Kumar (2006) showed that advanced algorithms are needed to enhance DPI’s ability 
to meet the challenge.  They argued the processing bottleneck is a result of the speed in which 
comparisons between known electronic signatures and quickly moving data occurs.  As the data 
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is moving at ever increasing speeds, it is necessary for the processing to increase at the same rate 
as the bandwidth.  Not until recently have DPI device vendors been able to come close to real-
time DPI for mass market consumption.  Even then, the financial costs can be prohibitive.  
Anderson (2007) noted that “...top-of-the-line products can set you back several hundred 
thousand dollars, but some of them can inspect and shape every single packet—in real time—
for nearly a million simultaneous connections while handling 10-gigabit Ethernet speeds and 
above.”  The processing power needed to make DPI successful at real time speeds has been the 
major roadblock to widespread adaptation of the technology. 
Along with throughput concerns comes the fact that DPI devices depend upon software to 
match, categorize, interpret and finally decide which packets are allowed to pass.  As with any 
software, there are bound to be some cases of vulnerability.  According to Porter (2005), Remote 
Procedure Call (RPC) attacks, stack overflow attacks, buffer overflow attacks, VoIP command 
processing vulnerabilities and H.225 messages over TCP are all cases of known DPI 
vulnerabilities.  Even though DPI provides a robust manner in which to monitor network 
communications, it is an evolving technology. 
2.2 Traffic Shaping 
 Traffic shaping is defined as, “the appropriate allocation of bandwidth to support 
application requirements” (Goldman, 2004).  This boils down to ISPs ranking network traffic 
and throttling bandwidth in accordance to the ranking.  The rankings can be based on several 
different factors, such as service level agreements, types of traffic, application requirements and 
performance considerations. 
DEEP PACKET INSPECTION AND ITS EFFECTS ON NET NEUTRALITY   11 
 Shaping network traffic is accomplished by either controlling the pace of the data or by 
queuing the data for a timed release.  These two methodologies can also be combined to further 
control or shape the traffic as it travels over a network.  Georgiadis (1996) stated that “Reshaping 
makes the traffic at each node more predictable and, therefore, simplifies the task of 
guaranteeing performance to individual connections; when used with a particular scheduling 
policy, it allows the specification of worst case delay bounds at each node.  End-to-end delay 
bounds can then be computed as the sum of the worst case delay bounds at each node along the 
path.”  This is analogous to an interstate highway at rush hour.  Traffic flows in the main lanes, 
while stop lights queue on ramp traffic to enter the interstate in a staggered fashion.  All the 
while, the carpool lane is comfortably cruising at above average speeds.   
2.3 Deep Packet Inspection Devices 
DPI devices are a combination of previous filtering technology with deep packet 
inspection functionality.  Stateful inspection, packet sniffing and firewall technology work in 
concert with the DPI database to perform network monitoring and traffic shaping on a level that 
has not previously been attainable.  As speeds and functionality improve, deep packet inspection 
will become embedded within the network core. 
Several flavors of deep packet inspection devices exist, but devices are mainly found in 
the form of hardware firewalls.  The main consideration with DPI devices is the throughput in 
which they can operate.  Deep inspection of packets is expensive in terms of processing and 
memory overhead.  Porter (2005) stated that “searching through the payload for multiple string 
patterns within the data stream is a computationally expensive task. The requirement that these 
searches be performed at wire speed adds to the cost.”  
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2.4 Benefits of Deep Packet Inspection 
Deep packet inspection can provide many benefits for corporate and ISP environments.  
The addition of a DPI to a network monitoring portfolio can help to bolster the services and 
security provided by their respective networks.  Increased service levels can be attained by 
utilizing content-based traffic management while increased understanding and control of their 
networks will help to cut operating and capital expenditures.  Application aware switches can 
provide increased load balancing, authentication and monitoring capabilities.  In addition to 
increased service levels and more control, DPI can help ISPs secure their networks by 
implementing network intrusion detection systems based on electronic signatures of well known 
threats. 
 Previous network monitoring devices only gave the network administrators an overview 
of bandwidth, services and the destination of network traffic.  By adding DPI functionality, 
network monitoring takes a step up to the next level.  Companies will be able to stop many 
network attacks in their tracks.  Combining existing intrusion prevention technology with the 
additional filtering of DPI devices will allow for networks to identify and prevent many attacks 
that currently are able to bypass today’s prevention measures.  ISPs will be able to shape their 
bandwidth to better serve their customers most critical needs.  DPI will allow them to throttle 
services at peak usage times to better accommodate the needs of their customers.  While a DPI 
device is in use, ISPs and corporations will gain a deeper understanding of what their networks 
are actually being used for.  This greater level of knowledge will allow them to focus on specific 
areas of need and not waste time or expense on areas that are performing up to par.  As a result 
of a more controlled network, companies can focus on additional services and offerings that will 
help to generate additional opportunities for revenue generation.  Hill (2006) wrote that “Once 
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ISPs have networks under better control, it is time to look into how to extract additional revenue 
streams, and DPI can be leveraged to create additional tiers of service.” 
2.5 Net Neutrality 
The advent of inspecting the data payloads of packets traversing the network is a 
powerful tool which can help better manage traffic, increase security, and shape usage.  The 
ability to inspect the data portion of IP packets, however, poses challenges to net neutrality.  
What is net neutrality?  Jordan (2009) defined net neutrality as, “the idea that Internet 
users are entitled to service that does not discriminate on the basis of source, destination, or 
ownership of Internet traffic.”  The implications of net neutrality are vast and it is getting 
attention.  For example:  
• Google and Verizon released their joint policy proposal aimed preserving the openness of 
the Web, but exempting net neutrality regulation to the mobile industry (Krigman, 2010). 
• The FCC now requires ISPs to treat lawful content, applications, and services in a 
nondiscriminatory manner (Feldman, 2010).   
• Congress was debating the Waxman Net Neutrality Bill, requiring ISPs to follow the 
basic principles of the "open internet" advocated by net neutrality supporters, including 
bans on the blocking of unreasonable interference with lawful content, applications, 
services and devices.  The bill has since been dropped, but it is evidence that net 
neutrality continues to be a hot topic (Kennedy, 2010). 
One of the main drivers for net neutrality was to prevent ISPs and backbone network 
providers to charge more for specific types of network traffic (Economides, 2008).  This 
differentiation of network communications is greatly enhanced by devices that can peer deep into 
the payload of network communications and report the type and content of the data being 
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transmitted.  Jordan (2009) wrote that advocates of net neutrality want to prohibit discrimination 
of Internet communication by ISPs based on dedicated bandwidth or improved QoS.  He argues 
that these discriminations could result in outright blocking of sites or content types which could 
result in a decrease in innovation and development.  Jordan contends that dedicated bandwidth 
and improved QoS as a result of priority access offerings should not be allowed due to the 
restrictive costs imposed by ISPs for these premium services.  
Those against net neutrality argue that free market forces and competition will be 
sufficient regulation of ISPs, as any official regulation will hinder ISPs ability to fund 
infrastructure improvements (Jordan 2009). It is an age old argument, free market versus 
regulation, but in this case DPI devices provide the ability that oversteps the boundaries of 
network performance and encroaches on basic rights of free speech.  As such, net neutrality is 
one of the main arguments against increased use of DPI.   
When asked about how concerned he was about Internet companies using his bandwidth, 
AT&T CEO Ed Whitacre stated, “How do you think they’re going to get to customers? Through 
a broadband pipe. Cable companies have them. We have them. Now what they would like to do 
is use my pipes free, but I ain’t going to let them do that because we have spent this capital and 
we have to have a return on it. So there’s going to have to be some mechanism for these people 
who use these pipes to pay for the portion they’re using. Why should they be allowed to use my 
pipes? The Internet can’t be free in that sense, because we and the cable companies have made 
an investment and for a Google or Yahoo! or Vonage or anybody to expect to use these pipes 
[for] free is nuts!” (Economedies 2008).  
The ability of ISPs to track, monitor and thoroughly log the data being sent over their 
networks, raises important ethical questions.  Is it even ethical to parse through data being sent 
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via network communications?  Surely a private corporation is well within its rights to monitor 
data transmitted by its employees, but is it right for an ISP to log the data sent by its customers?  
Proponents of net neutrality also raise issues with ISPs throttling back services or charging extra 
for those that utilize higher bandwidth or services that are deemed less than critical.  Deep packet 
inspection and subsequent logging of the mined data are tantamount to bugging your phone line, 
and in fact could be exactly that in the case of voice over IP (VoIP) communications (Renals, 
2009).  Throw in government monitoring of private citizens and DPI gives ISPs the technology 
to comply with government surveillance initiatives. “Although the technology isn't yet common 
knowledge among consumers, DPI already gives network neutrality backers nightmares and 
enables American ISPs to comply with Commission on Accreditation for Law Enforcement 
Agencies (CALEA) (government-ordered Internet wiretaps) reporting requirements” (Anderson, 
2007). 
2.6 Summary 
This chapter focused on the technology of deep packet inspection, the devices that 
employ the technology and the different ways it is used.  It also examined the principles behind 
net neutrality and how DPI is at odds with a free Internet. Deep packet inspection can come in 
many forms, and provide great functionality, but it also gives ISPs the means to threaten net 
neutrality. 
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Chapter 3 – Methodology 
This research proceeded in three phases.  The first step was to gather the academic 
literature on net neutrality and deep packet inspection to identify any gaps in knowledge.  The 
results of this phase formed the basis of Chapter 2.  The second phase developed questions based 
on the identified gaps in the knowledgebase.  In phase three, the survey was conducted to 
quantify the assertions made in the first two phases.   
3.1 Ontology 
While most of the technological facts about the benefits of deep packet inspection are 
empirical, or fact based, the main focus of the argument for restraining the technology came 
from personal perspectives with citations from non empirical sources.  This maintained an 
overarching approach to the study which encompassed the technological facts along with 
affirming and deferring opinions, which were generated through a survey of general Internet 
users. 
By employing qualitative ontology to the thesis, the goal was to discover how deep 
packet inspection technology impacts privacy and net neutrality.  This qualitative approach 
allowed for the research to be measured against general principles of right and wrong and how 
those principles change based on the environment.  Once the study was complete, it was apparent 
the privacy concerns due to monitoring of telephone service, were more clearly understood and 
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held in higher regard than the privacy concerns of monitoring Internet communications.  This 
further proved that the perceived gap in the body of knowledge existed and needed to be 
accounted for.   
3.2 Questions and Survey 
As noted, Chapter 2 contains the results of the first phase of the research.  Gaps in the 
literature were discovered and areas of improvement were apparent.     The literature review also 
provided a foundation for the remaining two phases:  question development and survey. 
In phase two, questions were developed.  The survey consisted of 33 questions divided 
into four sections: a) background information, such as field of work (IT vs. non-IT), knowledge 
of packet inspection and traffic shaping, b) details on Internet Service Providers with regards to 
how they treat network communications, regulation and pricing, c) descriptions of Telephone 
Service Providers such as phone tapping, conversation shaping and regulation, and d) privacy of 
communications.  For a list of the survey questions, see Appendix A. 
The participants were asked to rank each survey statement on a scale of 1 – 5, with an 
answer of 1 meaning strongly disagree with the statement and an answer of 5 meaning strongly 
agree with the statement.  These rankings were combined to tally a final score for each survey 
question.  For example, a score of 4.45 would mean that the majority of respondents strongly 
agree with the statement, while a score of .25 would indicate that most respondents strongly 
disagree with the statement.  An average score of 3 would show that the average respondent fell 
somewhere in the middle (an average of 3 could also mean half strongly agreed and half strongly 
disagreed, but that scenario was not present in the result set). 
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In phase three, the researcher posted the survey to Facebook.  The survey was available 
for two weeks, August 28
 
to September 11 2010.  Once the allotted timeframe expired, the 
survey was closed and the results were tallied.   
Of the 200 invitations extended, 68 (33%) responses were received. As expected, each 
respondent was a technology user with at least a passing knowledge of Internet usage (only those 
with Facebook accounts were surveyed). The general goal was to extract a theme or pattern to 
display the knowledge level and attitudes of Internet users with regards to the topics covered in 
this study.   
3.3 Summary 
 Any endeavor worth attempting requires a plan.  Through research of the academic 
literature involving deep packet inspection, net neutrality and their relationships, a gap in the 
knowledge base was ascertained.  This study embraced the missing components and presented 
new research, accompanied by empirical data, to fill the void.  The plan became a framework 
which allowed the research to be quantified.  Once the research was in place, deliverables were 
created to support the study.  These deliverables included the academic research and the survey 
of Internet users.  The combination of deliverables formed the basis of what is hoped to be a 
solid contribution to the field by directly addressing the identified gaps in the body of 
knowledge.  By specifically targeting an audience that stood to gain the most from the study, the 
methodology was doubly effective as it was able to educate while it collected data.  This research 
framework allowed the study to uncover real concerns about privacy while detailing the 
relationship between deep packet inspection and net neutrality. 
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Chapter 4 – Data Analysis and Findings 
The survey suggested several findings that seem to support the investigation into how 
DPI threatens net neutrality.  The results of the study revealed that most users are not aware of 
the dangers posed by DPI and that many IT insiders were only slightly more informed.  The 
second finding showed that even though considerable literature on DPI exists, it is largely 
targeted to the engineering side of the technology.  The last finding displayed that although 
literature on net neutrality is vast, little research has been documented on how damaging DPI 
technology can be to net neutrality. 
4.1 Background Information 
Table 1 provides an overview on the technical background of survey respondents.  Of the 
68 respondents, 14 or 21% work in the IT field, while 53 or 79% do not (1 abstained from 
answering).  This question was posed to decipher the demographics of the audience and to 
provide a means to compare the results between IT and non-IT workers. 
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Table 1 
Which Best Describes Your Background? 
 
Table 2 shows the lack of awareness of DPI.  The majority of respondents 46, or 68% 
were not aware of what packet inspection was.  Even fewer know about deep packet inspection, 
55 or 81% or traffic shaping 52 or 77%.  These questions set the baseline for the group as a 
whole.  When viewing the results, they begin to show that a gap exists in the general Internet 
user’s knowledge of network monitoring and filtering. 
Table 2 
Background Knowledge Questions (All Participants). 
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To explore these findings further, the researcher looked those working in the IT field.  
The data in Table 3 shows that all respondents knew what packet inspection was, while 9, or 
64% knew about deep packet inspection and 10, or 71% were familiar with traffic shaping.   It 
was no surprise that greater knowledge of network monitoring and filtering technologies was 
expected of those in the IT field. 
Table 3 
Background Knowledge Questions (IT Field Only). 
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Inversely, by looking at the same questions when asked only to non-IT workers, the 
results speak loudly.  As shown in Table 4, only 8 respondents, or 15% knew what packet 
inspection was, while only 4 or 7% knew about deep packet inspection and only 6, or 11% were 
familiar with traffic shaping.  When comparing IT workers against non-IT workers, there was a 
decrease in background knowledge of 85%, 57%, and 60% respectively.  A decrease was 
expected, but this radical fall off provided solid evidence that serious gaps in network monitoring 
knowledge exists and a reminder that what may seem like common knowledge to industry 
insiders, could be foreign to laymen.   
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Table 4 
Background Knowledge Questions (Non-IT Field Only). 
 
 
 
4.2 Privacy and Content 
Once the background information was cataloged, the study moved to understand the 
attitudes of respondents towards privacy and content.  As previously discussed, the format 
changed from yes or no responses to a rating scale, where a score of 0 meant the respondent 
strongly disagreed with the statement and a score of 5 meant they strongly agreed.  The first 
segment focused on Internet Service Providers. 
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Should ISPs be allowed to monitor network communications? As Table 5 shows, answers 
to this question scored a .9 making it clear that the respondents did not think ISPs should be 
allowed to examine user network communications.  This response was echoed when the subject 
switched to telephone communications as well.  These queries were included to validate the 
necessity of privacy when communicating over any medium and the response overwhelmingly 
confirmed the need.  
Table 5 
Examination of Network and Telephone Communications. 
 
 
 After establishing the need for privacy, the study continued and focused on ISPs ability to 
delay or deny communications based on the content being sent.  Table 6 presents the scores of 
1.46 in response to deny communications and 1.49 in response to delay communications.  While 
not as lopsided as the answers in Table 5, the scores clearly illustrate disapproval of ISPs 
denying or delaying communications based on the content. 
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Table 6 
ISPs Should Be Allowed to Deny or Delay Communications. 
 
 
 The same questions were posed regarding telephone communications.  In response to 
service provider’s ability to deny or delay communications, the subjects disagreed even more 
stringently.  As shown in Table 7, the scores tallied 1.14 and 1.2, clearly laying out a disdain for 
any type of delaying or denying of communications based on content.  This is a critical point that 
must be disseminated; Internet and telephone users do not want their communications disrupted 
based on the type of content they are utilizing. 
Table 7 
Telephone Deny or Delay Communications. 
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 To cap off the content based questions, the survey turned to the respondent’s attitudes 
towards content based fees.  For both network and telephone communications, the subjects 
decreed a strong unwillingness to pay for service based on content.    In this case, the scores for 
both network communications (1.75) and telephone communications (1.61) were squarely placed 
in the strongly disagree category.   As evidenced in Table 8, the thought of paying a premium for 
specific types of communications did not sit well. 
Table 8 
Premium Content, Premium Fees? 
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4.3 Regulation 
The content and privacy attitudes were clearly displayed as evidenced by reviewing the 
results in the previous segment, but the trend did not continue with the regulation results as they 
were a bit more ambiguous.   
After reviewing the data for the network monitoring topics (packet inspection, deep 
packet inspection and traffic shaping), the majority of the answers were agreeable (final score of 
~3) for regulation, but disagreeable (final score of ~2) for government regulation.  The general 
regulation results are defined in Table 9, which showed the respondents were middle of the road 
when asked about general regulation of packet inspection, deep packet inspection and traffic 
shaping.  Table 10 illustrated that the respondents did not feel government regulation was the 
answer.  Following suite, the questions surrounding regulation by a standards agency scored 
roughly on par with general regulation as shown in Table 11.  These results detail the overall 
uneasiness felt around government regulation, but still supported that some regulation would be 
beneficial.  
Table 9 
To Regulate or Not To Regulate? 
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Table 10 
Government Regulation? 
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Table 11 
Standards Agency Regulation? 
 
 
 
4.4 Trust and Moral Obligations 
 As deep packet inspection gives ISPs the ability to peer into the content of network 
communications, the threat of abuse is present.  The study attempted to gauge the respondent’s 
feelings about whether or not service providers had moral obligations when utilizing network 
monitoring technology.  Table 12 shows that while the ratings were agreeable, with scores of 
3.34 for ISPs and 3.47 for telephone service providers.  This shows that even though the 
respondents were lukewarm towards regulation, they felt that there still was a moral obligation 
for service providers when examining communications. 
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Table 12 
Moral Obligations?   
 
 
 Continuing the theme of the previous statements, the next two survey questions dealt with 
trust.  As illustrated in Table 13, Internet users felt they could somewhat trust service providers 
to examine only the content and not the information of their communications.  It should be noted, 
that the highest tallies were present in the strongly disagree (no trust) options on both statements 
and the lowest tallies were in the strongly agree (trust) columns. 
Table 13 
Trusted Providers.  
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4.5 Privacy of Communications 
The loudest declaration from the respondents was far and away their privacy concerns.  
These last two questions were included to put a statement on the survey, and the results came 
through.  Table 14 shows the direct privacy questions scored the highest of all questions.  When 
asked if Internet and telephone communications should be private, the audience resoundingly 
agreed, with scores of 4.44 and 4.55.  These final questions were further evidence that privacy is 
a concern that is of utmost importance to general Internet users.  
Table 14 
Privacy of Communications. 
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4.6 Summary 
Clearly the results provided a deeper understanding of the technical knowledge and 
attitudes of general Internet population.  This understanding validated that the identified gap in 
the literature would directly address the concerns of the public. 
Once the demographics of the study were established, the results between IT and non-IT 
workers showed a vast difference in network monitoring knowledge.  This delta in the 
knowledge adds to the evidence that more research and communication is needed to ensure the 
general population is educated about threats to their privacy.  When queried about regulation, the 
audience felt it was a good idea, but they felt strongly that government regulation was not the 
answer.  That privacy was worth worrying about was validated as the respondents made it clear 
they want their communications to remain private and they want service providers to stay away 
from the information they are sharing.
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Chapter 5 – Discussion and Conclusions 
This researcher believes this study contributes to the literature still dominated by 
engineering issues and public policy debate.  The findings help explain how a gap in the 
literature can have far reaching consequences and the need for more education and awareness of 
the general public with regards to privacy of communications is needed.  Analyzing the results 
clearly illustrated a desire for privacy, yet the knowledge of network monitoring technologies 
was scant at best.  Without raising the awareness of technologies like deep packet inspection and 
communicating the dangers it carries, net neutrality will be difficult to achieve. 
In designing the research, a three phase methodology was adopted.  The first phase was 
to gather existing literature on deep packet inspection and net neutrality and how they related to 
privacy of communications.  The gap in the literature became evident.  Once the empirical data 
was garnered, the second phase focused on generating questions to help gauge the attitudes and 
knowledge of Internet users.  Once the questions were in hand, they were presented via survey to 
help quantify the aforementioned literature gap. 
The methodology used may limit the use and interpretation of the data.  First, by relying 
on qualitative means to demonstrate the missing links, the study will always be open to 
interpretation.  As the nature of qualitative research is to generate and quantify opinions, it can 
only be as strong as the opinions and the analysis of them.  This is especially difficult when the 
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subject matter is as controversial as net neutrality.  Second, the number of respondents was 
small.  But this researcher believes that even with a greater number of respondents, the overall 
trends would remain largely unchanged.  The focus of the study was to fill a gap in the literature.  
The validity of the gap was proven as the drastic differences in knowledge between IT and non-
IT workers was displayed in the results.  The study’s ability to fill that gap will be judged as time 
passes.  This study should be considered an early attempt to investigate the linkages between 
deep packet inspection and net neutrality.   The literature could benefit from other studies; 
notably - a survey of ISPs.   Further research is necessary to ensure that while technology 
advances, so does the ability to keep a balance between progress and privacy.  This research 
generally supports the belief that DPI endangers net neutrality and privacy.  But more research 
would, in the long run, produce a more complete picture of the challenges that DPI poses to net 
neutrality. 
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Appendix A – Survey Questions 
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Appendix B - Survey Results 
Section 1 - BACKGROUND QUESTIONS (4 questions) 
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Section 2 - INTERNET SERVICE PROVIDERS (15 questions) 
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Section 3 - TELEPHONE SERVICE PROVIDERS (12 Questions) 
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Section 4 - PRIVACY OF COMMUNICATIONS (2 questions) 
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